Abstract. A digital signature scheme is one of essential cryptographic primitives for secure transactions over open networks. Korean cryptographic community, in association with government-supported agencies, has made a continuous e ort over past three years to develop our own signature standard. The outcome of this long e ort is the signature algorithm called KCDSA, which is now at the nal stage of standardization process and will be published as one of KICS (Korean Information and Communication Standards). This paper describes the proposed signature algorithm and discusses its security and e ciency aspects.
Introduction
The digital signature technique, a technique for signing and verifying digital documents in an unforgeable way, is essential for secure transactions over open networks. Digital signatures can be used in a variety of applications to ensure the integrity of data exchanged or stored and to prove to the recipient the originator's identity.
A group of Korean cryptographers, in association with government-supported agencies, has been developing a candidate algorithm for Korean digital signature standard, which is named KCDSA temporarily (standing for Korean Certi catebased Digital Signature Algorithm). As a result of such e ort over three years, a nal algorithm has been established and is now being standardized by the Korean Government. This signature algorithm, once standardized, is hopefully to be widely supported in commercial security products by Korean industries and possibly by the Government. In addition, a standard hash algorithm, developed for use with KCDSA, is also under standardization process.
The security of most signature schemes widely used in practice is based on two di cult problems: the problem of factoring integers (e.g., RSA 16] ) and the problem of nding discrete logarithms over nite elds (e.g., Elgamal 5] ). The RSA scheme is used in many applications as a de facto standard. On the other hand, two variants of the Elgamal scheme have been standardized in U.S.A as digital signature standard (DSS) 19] and in Russia as GOST 34. 10 (see 10] ). KCDSA is also a Elgamal-type signature scheme. There have been a lot of discussions on whether our national standard should be either of RSA type or of Elgamal type. There also has been some controversy on establishing a new standard other than the widely used schemes such as RSA and DSA. Putting aside the behind story, we concluded to design our own signature scheme and KCDSA is the outcome. KCDSA is designed by incorporating several features from the recent cryptographic research and thus is believed to be secure and robust.
In this paper we describe the proposed standard for KCDSA and discuss security and e ciency aspects considered during the design process. Throughout this paper we will use the following symbols and notation: { a b : exclusive-or of two bit strings a and b. { a k b : concatenation of two bit strings a and b. { Z n = f0; 1; ; n ? 1g and Z n = fxj1 x n ? 1 & gcd(x; n) = 1g. { jAj denotes the bit-length of A for integer A and the cardinality of A for set A.
{ k 2 r S denote that k is chosen at random over the set S. This paper is organized as follows. We describe KCDSA parameters in Section 2 and the detailed signature algorithm in Section 3. The security and e ciency aspects of KCDSA are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6 we brie y describe an elliptic curve variant of KCDSA and nally we conclude in Section 7.
KCDSA Parameters
KCDSA parameters can be divided into domain parameters and user parameters. By domain we mean a group of users who shares the same public parameters (domain parameters). Domain may consist of a single user if the user uses its own public parameters. User parameters denote parameters which are speci c to each user and cannot be shared with others. These parameters must be established before normal use of digital signatures by some trusted authorities and/or by users. KCDSA makes use of the following domain and user parameters (see Appendix for a procedure that can be used to generate domain parameters): Domain Parameters: p; q; g such that { p : a large prime such that L p = jpj = 512 + 256i for i = 0; 1; ; 6. That is, the bit-length of p can vary from 512 bits to 2048 bits with increment by a multiple of 256 bits. { q : a prime factor of p ? 1 such that L q = jqj = 128 + 32j for j = 0; 1; ; 4 KCDSA is a signature algorithm in which the public key is validated by means of a certi cate issued by some trusted authority. The X.509-based certi cate may be used for this purpose. In this case, the Cert Data can be simply the formatted certi cation data de ned by X.509.
KCDSA also requires a collision-resistant hash function which produces L qbit outputs. Since q can vary in size from 128 bits to 256 bits with increment by a multiple of 32 bits, we need a family of hash functions or a hash function which can produce variable length outputs up to 256 bits. Currently standardization is being processed for a hash algorithm with 160-bit outputs called HAS-160. Hash functions for the other sizes of q are left as a future work.
3 The Signature Algorithm
Signature generation
The signer can generate a signature frksg for a message m as follows:
1. randomly picks an integer k in Z q and computes w = g k mod p, 2. computes the rst part r of the signature as r = h(w), 3 . computes e = r h(zkm) mod q, and 4. computes the second part s of the signature as s = x(k ? e) mod q. 1 This restriction on the size of prime factors of (p ? 1)=2q is to take precautions against possible attacks using small order subgroups of Z p in various applications of
KCDSA (see 8] for details).
The computation of w is the most time-consuming operation in the signing process. However, since the rst two steps can be performed independent of a speci c message to be signed, we may precompute and securely store the pair fr; kg for fast on-line signature generation. The above signing process can be described in brief by the following two equations: r = h(g k mod p) with k 2 r Z q ; s = x(k ? r h(zkm)) mod q:
3.2 Signature Veri cation On receiving fmkrksg, the veri er can check the validity of the signature as follows:
1. rst checks the validity of the signer's certi cate, extracts the signer's certi cation data Cert Data from the certi cate and computes the hash value z = h(Cert Data). 3 2. checks the size of r and s : 0 < r < 2 jqj ; 0 < s < q, 3 . computes e = r h(zkm) mod q, 4 . computes w 0 = y s g e mod p and 5. nally checks that r = h(w 0 ).
The pair frksg is a valid signature for m only if all the checks succeed. The above verifying process can be described in brief by the following equations:
For comparison, we summarized three signature standards, DSA, GOST and KCDSA, in Table 1. 4 Security Considerations
Security Proof under Random Oracle Model
Recently two variants of ElGamal-like signature schemes have been proven secure against adaptive attacks for existential forgery under the random oracle model 3], where the hash function is replaced with an oracle producing a random value for each new query. In the rst variant, h(m) is replaced with h(mkr) as in the Schnorr signature scheme. This variant was proven secure by Pointcheval and Stern 13] at Eurocrypt'96. The other variant is due to Brickell 4] at Crypto'96, 3 Note that a certi cate corresponds to a trusted authority's signature for the formatted data containing all information required to bind the public key and related parameters/attributes to the key owner's identity. Therefore, the computation of z can be in fact part of the certi cate validation process by taking Cert Data as the formatted data to be signed. where he claimed that the variant of DSA with r = (g k mod p) mod q replaced by r = h(g k mod p) is also secure in the random oracle model (see 14] for its proof by Pointcheval and Vaudenay). We followed the latter approach to ensure the security of the overall design of KCDSA. From the proof under the random oracle model we can be assured that KCDSA will be secure provided that the hash function used has no weakness.
Security against Parameter Manipulation
There have been published a lot of weaknesses in the design of discrete logbased schemes due to the use of unsafe parameters (later shown insecure) (e.g., see 12, 2, 1, 18, 8] ). Note that generating public parameters at random so that they do not have any speci c structure is very important for security, even with a provably secure scheme (compare the results from 2] and 13]. see also 17]). KCDSA is designed to be secure against all these potential weaknesses. The (proposed) standard recommend to use the strongest form of primes 8], i.e., primes p; q such that (p ? 1)=2q is also a prime or at least its prime factors are all greater than q. It also speci es a procedure that can be used for generation of such primes (see Appendix A). The certi cate produced by this procedure can be used to verify proper generation of the parameters. Considering current algorithms and technology for nding discrete logarithms (see 11]), we recommend to use a modulus p of size 1024 bits and an auxiliary prime q of 160 bits for moderate security in most applications.
The use of the parameter z = h(Cert Data) as a pre x message for hashing provides several advantages without much increase of computational/operational overheads. 4 It e ectively prevents possible manipulations during parameter generation, such as hidden collisions in DSS 18], since Cert Data contains p; q; g and y.
In addition, the use of z restricts the collision search in the hash function to a speci c signer, since each signer uses his/her own pre x z to produce a hash code for his/her message. To see its usefulness, suppose that in the case of using the usual hash code h(m) a collision is found for a speci c pair of messages. Also suppose that one message out of the pair is a comfortable message that anyone can sign without reluctance. Then the collision can be used to any user to claim that the signature is for the harmful message. Realization of this scenario may be catastrophic, for example, if there exists some powerful organization willing to invest a huge amount of money to nd collisions (the organization might nd some unpublished weakness in the hash function which can substantially reduce the time for exhaustive search). Our new hash mode with a user-speci c pre x can e ectively thwart such a trial of total forgery unless a serious weakness is found for the hash function.
E ciency Considerations
KCDSA is designed to avoid the evaluation of multiplicative inverses in normal use. It is only needed at the time of key pair generation. For comparison, in DSA a multiplicative inverse mod q needs to be evaluated each time a signature is generated or veri ed and in GOST each time a signature is veri ed (see Table  1 ). Evaluating an inverse mod q would take very little portion in the overall workload of signing/verifying on most general purpose computers. However, it may be quite expensive in a limited computing environment such as smart cards (see 15] for various comments on DSS including debates on the use of inverse). On the other hand, KCDSA needs one more call for a hash function to digest a message of length jpj during both the signature generation and the veri cation process. This will not cost much in any environment.
We have implemented various signature schemes in the C language with inline assembly 9] and measured their timings on 90 MHz Pentium and 200 MHz Pentium Pro. The result is shown in Table 2   5 As can be expected, KCDSA and DSA show almost the same performance gures, but GOST runs about 63 % ( 160 256 ) slower than KCDSA/DSA since it uses a 256-bit prime q. For comparison, we also measured the speed of RSA for the same size of modulus. 4 In the present standard the hashed cert. data z is used as part of message (i.e., zkm is treated as a message to be signed). However, it may be more desirable to separate z from the message to be signed. For example, we may use z itself as a user-speci c IV or complete z into one block by zero-padding and use h(zkpad) as a user-speci c IV. These variants will be further discussed in the next revision.
Note that signature generation can be substantially speeded up in both RSA and Notes : C = C only, D = C with double digit option ( int64) provided by MSVC, A = C with partial inline assembly. used CRT for signature generation. used a precomputation table of 32 KBytes (6 4 con g., see 7]). Table 2 . Speed of various signature schemes for 1024-bit moduli (in msec) 6 Elliptic Curve KCDSA Much attention has been paid to elliptic curve cryptosystems in recent years, due to their stronger security and higher speed with smaller key size. An elliptic curve variant of KCDSA (EC-KCDSA for short) was not considered during the standardization process. However, we have recently worked on an alternative implementation of KCDSA over elliptic curves and completed a high-level speci cation of EC-KCDSA. The following brief description on EC-KCDSA is expected to be included in the next revision or as an addendum. Let E be an elliptic curve over a nite eld and #(E) be the order of E (the total number of points on E). The curve E should be chosen so that #(E) is divided by a prime q of size L q bits. Domain parameters consist of the description of the elliptic curve E, the prime q and a point G = (g x ; g y ) over E generating a cyclic group of prime order q. 6 As user parameters, each signer picks at random a private signature key x over Z q and computes the corresponding public key Y as Y = xG over E, where x = x ?1 mod q. The hashed certi cation data z and the hash function h are the same as before. Finally, for simplicity we write h(W) for an elliptic curve point W = (w x ; w y ) to denote h(w x kw y ). Note here that the two coordinates w x ; w y are treated as bit strings and thus they are simply concatenated (without conversion from elliptic curve point to integer) and hashed.
The signing and verifying processes of EC-KCDSA are almost the same as those of KCDSA, except for the change of group operations. That is, the underlying group is changed from the multiplicative group of a prime eld into the additive group of elliptic curve points. The signature for message m consists of two integers r; s of size jqj generated by r = h(kG) with k 2 r Z q ; s = x(k ? r h(zkm)) mod q;
where the computation of r consists of computing W = kG over E and then hashing the point W.
To verify the signature fmkrksg, a veri er rst performs the required checks on the certi cate and the size of signature components as in KCDSA (see steps 1 and 2 in Sect.3.2). The veri er then recovers the point W using the received signature and checks the equality r = h(W) = h(w x kw y ). That is, the verifying process can be described in brief by e = r h(zkm) mod q; r = h(sY + eG) ? In general, the security of EC-KCDSA will be stronger than KCDSA if both use the same size of q. However, more detailed security and e ciency analyses should be carried out after complete speci cation on various parameters.
Conclusion
We described the proposed digital signature standard for Korean community and discussed its security and e ciency. The presented algorithm is now close to publication as one of Korean Information and Communication Standards and hopefully to be widely used in security products by Korean industries and Government. We hope this publication to stimulate further investigation on its security and development of various useful applications based on it.
24. terminate with output p; q; g and Seed.
The Seed output can serve as a certi cate for proper generation of the parameters p; q and g. Anyone can check that p; q and g are generated as speci ed, since Seed contains all necessary information to verify their proper generation. For example, the following parameters (jpj = 1024; jqj = 160) were generated using the described algorithm, where we the initial user input s was taken as the rst 160 bits of the fractional part of = 3:14159 . From the seed, we can see that r = (p ? 1)=2q was found by testing 991 random numbers (rCount = 0x3df = 991) and p was found by testing 1192 primes of q (pCount = 0x77c = 1192) and so on. It is easy to verify that these parameters are generated according to the above procedure. Seed = 243f6a88 85a308D3 13198a2e 03707344 a4093822 00020101 03df077c 00d10100 p = a2951279 6e6cf682 fd9e3348 24859dfd 93299a22 7d9d6c97 226B9595 1725c3B5 3098ceaa 3e6a0241 d0c30586 61769311 9db2e9bc 2f9cad43 9f17fe3B 8a54f711 820421a0 394218e8 3186641d 00373299 08ab8D2f 97ffb1c7 5afaaba3 5e356ae8 7f83d2f8 d79d031c d814318f e7865810 16a3c871 a159056c 70722a62 cb89694f 7 The probability of gCount exceeding 255 is negligible (gCount = 1 for almost all cases). For completeness, we simply make the control to go back to step 3 in such an exceptional case (through steps 17, 18, 3). q = ada5ff8f 174cab84 0c846634 dede6e81 5ac8f6ef g = 1b2f2d3b a6551ffd a74ca533 011f1a92 8277d572 67297496 78a42bda 5ba6c181 9cf283ee 14a3fb44 dacbe42b b9720d2d 7137c81e 69cfc7cf 20a41bb1 e117fa7d 9b8d0cb0 73a91e51 15c08db8 60be3633 67a08ac2 b59137c2 0ccf54b9 0dbc2c8c 90958555 d76c0020 2798282a 23cafc54 7c7e7820 cf979902 2d3cde88 52d13753 
